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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTiONAL LAw-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE PROVIDING FOR THE ELEcTIoN OF COUNTY SUPERINTENDENTS

BY THE PEOPLE.

In the case of Robertson, et at. v. Hopkins County, 247 Ky. 129, 56
S. W. (2d) 700 (1933), the Court of Appeals declared the Kentucky Statute, 4399a-10, unconstitutional. This statute provided for the election
of the superintendent of each county by the popular vote of the people
excluding voters in cities of the first, second, third, and fourth classes.
The court decided in this case that the statute named above violated
section six of the state Constitution which states that all elections
shall be free and equal. As the schools are organized in Kentucky at
the present time the county superintendent has no control over the
schools in the classes of cities named above or in many independent
school districts organized by virtue of Kentucky Statute 4469. In the
case of cities of the fourth class the school district in many instances
extends beyond the limits of the city. The Court of Appeals said that
the statute created an unreasonable regulation of the franchise for
two reasons: (1) Voters in the independent school district are allowed
to vote for the county superintendent while voters in the classes of
cities named are prohibited. The schools in neither of these are in any
manner controlled by the county superintendent. (2) A voter living
just outside the city limits of a fourth class city but within the school
district of that city would have the privilege of -voting while a voter
living within the same district and also within the city limits would
not have the privilege of voting. It is needless to say that in this case
neither voter will in any manner be affected by the election of the
county superintendent.
According to Words and Phases, Volume II, p. 657, "free elections"
mean that the voter must be left in the untrammeled exercise of his
right or privilege; and "equal elections" mean that every qualified
elector's vote shall have its proportionate share of weight on the election. These definitions have not been accepted 'verbatim by the Court
of Appeals but their meaning and purport appear in several decisions.
City of Owensboro v. Hickman, 90 Ky. 629, 14 S. W. 688 (1890);
Hook~er v. Pendleton, 100 Ky. 726, 39 S. W. 250 (1897); Early v. Rain,
121 Ky. 439, 89 S. W. 289 (1905). The statute in question does not
violate the provision that elections shall be free, because no one who
has a right to vote for his school superintendent is in any way trammeled in the exercise of that right. But when we come to the part
that elections shall be equal, the situation is different. Unquestionably, It would be a reasonable regulation to prohibit a voter from voting for the election of a county superintendent who supervises a school
unit in which the voter does not reside. But when the prohibition on
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such voters is once begun, it should be extended to all that fall within
that class. If only some voters that are not under the control of the
county school unit are prohibited, the votes of the qualified electors do
not have their proportionate share of weight in the election. When
the Court of Appeals uses the expression "unreasonable regulation of
the franchise," as they have done in this case and many others, they
-undoubtedly mean unreasonable in the sense that it violates either the
rule of "free elections" or the rule of "equal elections". Under this
analysis of the case it is believed that the first reason given by the
Court of Appeals is more far-reaching than the second. With the inferences in mind that can be logically drawn from this case, it is
hard to see how any law which provides for the election of the county
-superintendent by the popular vote of the people can be made valid unless it allows all qualified vofers in each county or prohibits all who
do not reside in those portions of the counties that are controlled by
-the county school unit to vote,
HsNRY C. SMITH.

REAL PROPERTY-EXTENT OP EASEMENT AcQUIRED By PnEscRIpToN.
"The right of the owner of the domihant estate is governed by the
-character and the extent of the use of the easement during the prescriptive period." Ferguson v. Standley, 89 Mont. 489, 300 Pac. 245 (1931).
Numerous other cases make similar broad, general statements. "It
(the easement) must be limited to the use for which it is shown by the
-evidence to have been originally designed." Atwater v. Bodflsh, 11
Gray (Mass.) 150 (1850).
"The right derived from user can never
outrun or exceed the user in which it has its origin". Amer.-Bank Note
-Co. v. N. Y. Elec. 1. Co., 129 N. Y. 252, 29 N. E. 302 (1891).
Our problem is to determine the application of the above general
statements. This can best be done by first resorting to a review of
the decisions of the courts.
Situations in which it was held that the owner of the prescriptive
-easement did not exceed his rights therein.
Where the defendant has acquired a right of way by adverse user
-iA the matter of carrying materials for, and doing other things incident to, a blacksmith shop, a paint shop, and a carriage shop, and
where, when the buildings in which these shops were housed, burned,
the defendant erected a storehouse and a manufactory, the court held
that, as there was no substantial alteration in the condition or in the
-character of the dominant estate, and as there was no change, except
in degree, in the exercise of the easement, the defendant had not exceeded his rights in the use of the passway. The court went on to say
that, if the condition and the character of the dominant estate had
been substantially altered, the right of way could not be used for
new purposes, thereby imposing a greater burden on the servient
-estate. Parks v. Bishop, 120 Mass. 340 (1876).

